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ABSTRACT
In December of 2020, President Trump issued an executive
order on “Promoting Beautiful Federal Civic Architecture,” a
draft of which was leaked to the press in February under the title,
“Making Federal Buildings Beautiful Again.” The order provided
for updating the Guiding Principles of the General Services
Administration’s Design Excellence Program to promote the use of
“classical and traditional architectural styles,” which “have
proven their ability to inspire…respect for our system of selfgovernment.” According to the order, there would have been a
presumption against the use of such modern architectural styles as
Brutalism and Deconstructivism in the construction of new federal
public buildings, as these styles, according to Trump, fail to
convey “the dignity, enterprise, vigor, and stability of America’s
system of self-government.” The order was troubling in that it
proposed an official style that would have amounted to a
censorship regime. Had it not been quickly rescinded by President
Biden, the order would have deprived many architects and other
interested parties of their First Amendment rights. One can also
imagine a follow-up order calling for all new federal buildings—
which belong to the public—to be decorated in twenty-four karat
*
Juris Doctor Candidate, 2021, University of Pennsylvania Law School;
Doctor of Fine Arts, Dramaturgy and Dramatic Criticism, Yale School of
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gold leaf and marble. The Supreme Court has not ruled on the
question of whether architecture can be considered a form of
constitutionally protected “speech.” However, as an expressive
art, architecture should without question be among the forms
protected by the First Amendment. In this article, I explore the
First Amendment implications of Trump’s proposed order, the
limits on the public’s ability to use the First Amendment to contest
offensive government speech, and the ways in which existing law
fails to reckon with the unique limitations and possibilities of
architecture.
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I. INTRODUCTION
During President Trump’s first Senate impeachment trial, a draft of
an executive order under consideration was leaked to the press.
Titled “Making Federal Buildings Beautiful Again,” the draft
proposed updating the Guiding Principles of the General Services
Administration’s Design Excellence Program to promote the use of
“classical and traditional architectural styles,” which “have proven
their ability to inspire…respect for our system of selfgovernment.”1 According to the draft, modern architectural styles
such as Brutalism and Deconstructivism, which fail to “convey[]
1

Draft of Executive Order, Making Federal Buildings Beautiful Again,
https://docs.google.com/viewerng/viewer?url=https%3A%2F%2Fcdn.voxcdn.com%2Fuploads%2Fchorus_asset%2Ffile%2F19700169%2FDraft_of_Tru
mp_White_House_Executive_Order_on_Federal_Buildings.pdf&urp=gmail_lin
k (last visited Feb. 3, 2021).
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the dignity, enterprise, vigor, and stability of America’s system of
self-government…shall not be used” in the construction of any
federal buildings going forward.2 When holding design
competitions for new public buildings, the General Services
Administration would henceforth, according to the draft, convene
panels “composed of the public” to evaluate proposed designs.
Among those to be expressly excluded from these panels were
“artists, architects, engineers, [and] art or architecture critics.”3
The General Services Administration (“GSA”) is an
executive agency that is likely entirely subject to these kinds of
presidential whims.4 Proponents of a weaker unitary executive
theory believe that the framers did not constitutionalize
presidential control over all that we now think of as administration,
and that Congress may insulate certain functions from the
President by protecting agency officials with a “good cause”
discharge standard, but until 2020, the GSA has seldom been seen
as the kind of agency that required insulation from presidential
control.5 The GSA is responsible for managing and supporting the
basic functioning of federal infrastructure, facilitating everything
from government agencies’ paperclip purchases to the construction
of new federal courthouses. Many Americans only became aware
of the awesome power wielded by this agency when Administrator
Emily Murphy delayed the GSA’s ascertainment of the 2020
presidential election, preventing President-Elect Joe Biden’s
administration from beginning its transition for several weeks over
the objections of Congress.6
The Guiding Principles for Federal Architecture that have
controlled at the GSA for the past half century were derived from a
2

Id. at 3.
Id.
4
40 U.S.C. §301.
5
See Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the
Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1994).
6
See Nicholas Fandos, The head of the G.S.A. spurns a request from Congress
to be briefed on the transition, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 23, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/23/us/the-head-of-the-gsa-spurns-a-requestfrom-congress-to-be-briefed-on-the-transition.html.
3
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1962 report written by Senator Daniel Moynihan.7 In his capacity
as Chair of the Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Office Space,
Moynihan wrote to then-President Kennedy that it should be the
policy of the federal government “to provide requisite and
adequate facilities in an architectural style and form which is
distinguished and which will reflect the dignity, enterprise, vigor,
and stability of the American National Government.”8 Trump
appropriated this quartet of venerable, unobjectionable nouns for
his executive order, but it is there that the similarities between his
vision and Moynihan’s end. According to Senator Moynihan,“[i]t
should be our object to meet the test of Pericles’ evocation to the
Athenians, which the President commended to the Massachusetts
legislature in his address of January 9, 1961: ‘We do not imitate—
for we are a model to others.’”9 Moynihan called for major
emphasis to be placed on “the choice of designs that embody the
finest contemporary American architectural thought.”10 Exuding
early-‘60s optimism, the report is confidently forward-looking,
urging the government to embrace cutting-edge developments in
both architecture and art by calling for the work of living
American artists to be incorporated into the design schemes of
federal buildings whenever possible.11 Moynihan proposes that
federal architecture celebrate diversity by incorporating design
elements that reflect “the regional architectural traditions of that
part of the Nation in which buildings are located.”12 Perhaps most
importantly, to realize this goal, Moynihan wrote that “[t]he
development of an official style must be avoided. Design must
flow from the architectural profession to the Government, and not
vice versa.”13 Trump’s draft order, by contrast, was backwardlooking, and sought to ensure that design flows from the
U.S. GEN. SERV.’S ADMIN., GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR FEDERAL
ARCHITECTURE, https://www.gsa.gov/real-estate/design-construction/designexcellence/design-excellence-program/guiding-principles-for-federalarchitecture (last updated Feb. 26, 2019).
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id.
7
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government to the architectural profession. It also explicitly
favored the regional architectural traditions of some parts of the
country, calling for “the Spanish colonial and other Mediterranean
styles generally found in Florida and the American Southwest” to
be adopted nationwide. 14 This sounded suspiciously like a call for
all new federal buildings to look like the President’s “winter White
House,” Mar-a-Lago. While the private Palm Beach club may be
the President’s “happy place,” it is difficult to imagine this style
being suitable for, say, a courthouse in Minneapolis.15
While the Republican-controlled Senate acquitted Trump,
his administration was soon forced to confront the spread of
COVID-19 to the United States. Perhaps due to the unprecedented
social and economic disruptions brought on by the pandemic, the
“beautification” of America’s buildings ceased to be an immediate
federal priority. The draft nevertheless drew immediate criticism
from artists, architects, engineers, and art and architecture critics
concerned about the order’s eventual implementation.16 The draft
14

See Draft Executive Order supra note 1.
Darlene Superville, With Government Open Again, Trump Heads for Florida,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 1, 2019),
https://apnews.com/62d140ebc1e047b2b010cfad6ce1bc62.
16
See Press Release, Am. Inst. of Architects, AIA opposes uniform style
mandates (Feb. 4, 2020) (https://www.aia.org/press-releases/6263517-aiaopposes-uniform-style-mandates-) (“The AIA strongly opposes uniform style
mandates for federal architecture. Architecture should be designed for the
specific communities that it serves, reflecting our rich nation’s diverse places,
thought, culture and climates. Architects are committed to honoring our past as
well as reflecting our future progress, protecting the freedom of thought and
expression that are central to democracy.”); Letter from the Soc’y of
Architectural Historians to President Trump (Feb. 10, 2020)
(https://www.sah.org/about-sah/news/sah-news/news-detail/2020/02/06/societyof-architectural-historians-letter-in-opposition-to-proposed-executive-ordermaking-federal-buildings-beautiful-again?_zs=O89gX&_zl=Fe6w1) (“As an
organization whose members have observed, recorded, and analyzed both
historic and contemporary architecture since our inception in 1940, we have
come to understand that most significant public architecture in the United States
has resulted from the intersection of monumentality, permanence, and aesthetic
significance and the specific local demands of site and community...the dictation
of style—any style—is not the path to excellence in civic architecture.”);
Statement, National Trust for Historic Preservation (Feb. 6, 2020)
15
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order’s specification that they be excluded from future
conversations about federal building projects suggested that, by
virtue of their special expertise, members of their professions are
not part of “the public.”17 The alternative vision of “the public”
promoted by the draft order was a populist one, embodying the
hostility towards real or imagined “elites” that characterized much
of the Trump administration’s rhetoric.18
The order was not officially signed until 10 months later.19
By then, Trump had lost his bid for reelection to Biden but was
refusing to concede, spending his dwindling days in office
tweeting about voter fraud, raising money to—ostensibly—fund a
series of doomed lawsuits aimed at overturning the election results,
and issuing controversial pardons for his friends and other
criminals. When the order was published, it bore the slightly more
dignified title “Executive Order on Promoting Beautiful Federal
Civic Architecture,” but remained substantively suffused in
MAGA nostalgia.20 Where the draft order explicitly prohibited the
construction of new Brutalist and Deconstructivist buildings, the
(https://savingplaces.org/press-center/media-resources/national-trust-opposesproposed-order-mandating-traditional-architectural-styles#.XrGYrRNKh0u)
(“We strongly oppose any effort to impose a narrow set of styles for future
federal projects based on the architectural tastes of a few individuals that will
diminish, now and for the future, our rich legacy of federal architecture.”);
Michael Kimmelman, MAGA War on Architectural Diversity Weaponizes Greek
Columns, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2020)
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/07/arts/design/federal-buildingarchitecture.html (“Greek columns and Italianate windows don’t make a
building look more American to me.”); but see Justin Davidson, Trump’s
Classical-Architecture Edict Is Dumb — But Not Worth the Outrage, NEW
YORK (Feb. 10, 2020), https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2020/02/trumpsclassical-architecture-edict-isnt-worth-the-outrage.html (“The White House’s
proposed architectural edict is a boneheaded idea cooked up by a crackpot cabal
of ideologues who hate not just modern architecture but modernity itself. Yet on
the scale of Trump’s iniquities, the move barely registers. This administration’s
attack on the natural environment is far more dire than anything it could wreak
on the built environment.”).
17
See supra note 1 at 3.
18
Id.
19
Exec. Order No. 13,967, 85 Fed. Reg. 83,739 (Dec. 18, 2020).
20
Id.
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published order merely introduced a number of requirements
designed to make it especially onerous to build such buildings,
including the submission of “a detailed explanation of why the
[General Services] Administrator believes selecting such design is
justified, with particular focus on whether such design is as
beautiful and reflective of the dignity, enterprise, vigor, and
stability of the American system of self-government as alternative
designs of comparable cost using preferred architecture.”21 Where
the draft called for panels composed of the non-specialist public in
addition to a sitting President’s Committee for the ReBeautification of Federal Architecture to evaluate new building
designs, the published order only called for a President’s Council
on Improving Federal Civic Architecture.22 As described in the
draft, the only Committee seat reserved for someone with any
relevant expertise was to be occupied by a member of the U.S.
Commission of the Fine Arts designated by the President.23 The
published order held that the Council was to include all seven
members of the U.S. Commission of the Fine Arts, the Secretary of
the Commission of Fine Arts, the Architect of the Capitol, and the
Chief Architect of the GSA.24 The Council was also to include “up
to 20 additional members appointed by the President from among
citizens outside the Federal Government.”25 The published order
did away with much of the draft’s populist rhetoric, though it
added one curious sentence about ensuring “that architects
designing Federal buildings serve their clients, the American
people.”26
The significant difference between the draft order and
published order is that the published order largely dropped the
21

Id.
Id.
23
Draft of Executive Order, “Making Federal Buildings Beautiful Again,” 1, 5,
https://docs.google.com/viewerng/viewer?url=https%3A%2F%2Fcdn.voxcdn.com%2Fuploads%2Fchorus_asset%2Ffile%2F19700169%2FDraft_of_Tru
mp_White_House_Executive_Order_on_Federal_Buildings.pdf&urp=gmail_lin
k.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
Id.
22
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pretense that architectural “beauty” is in the eye of any beholder
who is not Trump himself. Members of the U.S. Commission of
Fine Arts are appointed by the President.27 Members appointed by
Trump have all been outspoken advocates of the “timelessness” of
classical architecture.28 The order cleared the way for Trump to
anoint surrogates who would impose the President’s own muchmaligned taste on the country even after he has gone back to being
a private citizen.29
By effectively silencing the vast majority of architects, the
order also raises freedom of speech concerns. As one commentator
has argued, “the First Amendment stands as a bulwark against the
imposition of the subjective tastes of the majority on the
minority.”30 Trump’s order bust through this bulwark, threatening
to impose the subjective taste of a very small minority indeed—
Trump alone—on the majority. One can imagine a follow-up
proclamation calling for all new federal buildings to be decorated
in twenty-four karat gold leaf.
Unfortunately, any First Amendment challenge to the
architecture order would face serious obstacles. As a threshold
issue, the idea that architecture should qualify as protectable
speech under the First Amendment is not itself uncontroversial.
Even if courts found architecture to be protectable in principle,
Trump’s order, as government speech, would arguably not be
subject to any First Amendment restrictions. The Supreme Court
has held that the “[g]overnment is not restrained by the First
27

Exec. Order No. 13,967, 85 Fed. Reg. 83,739 (Dec. 18, 2020).
See, e.g., John J. Miller, Something Lasting, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (Sept. 13,
2018), https://www.nationalreview.com/magazine/2018/10/01/duncan-stroikchurch-art-architecture/.
29
See, e.g., David Owen, The Psychological Insights of Trump Tower, NEW
YORKER (Apr. 10, 2017),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/04/17/the-psychological-insightsof-trump-tower (describing the marble tiles covering the atrium of Trump Tower
on Fifth Avenue as “the color of gastrointestinal inflammation”).
30
Janet Elizabeth Haws, Architecture as Art—Not in My Neocolonial
Neighborhood: A Case for Providing First Amendment Protection to Expressive
Residential Architecture, 2005 BYU L. REV. 1625 (2005).
28
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Amendment from controlling its own expression.”31 Because the
federal government cannot invite every architect to build its
courthouses, it must make choices regarding whom to commission
and whom not to commission. So long as the government does not
make its hiring determinations based on impermissible criteria—
race, sex, religion, etc.—the government would likely be
considered free to use whatever aesthetic criteria it likes for
selecting architectural proposals. The Supreme Court has held that
the government is not prohibited from engaging in viewpoint
discrimination regarding expressive permanent structures installed
on public property, even those installed on the grounds of
traditional public fora.32 Accordingly, existing doctrine would
seem to lend support to the proposition that a building erected on
public property—even one constructed for the purpose of
accommodating a public forum—is not itself a public forum, and
that the government would not therefore be prohibited from
engaging in viewpoint discrimination regarding the building’s style
and expressive content.33
This lack of a clear First Amendment remedy is
unsatisfying. The government, after all, has a monopoly on the
authority to erect courthouses, statehouses, and many other
buildings which should properly be considered the common
property of all citizens, the people’s houses. These buildings house
our organs of justice and mechanisms for making our voices heard.
Even the least glamorous among them—the buildings that house
our social security administration offices come to mind—host
those doing the righteous and essential work of ensuring that the
most vulnerable members of our society are cared for when unable
to support themselves. Federal architecture should reflect this
seriousness of purpose. It should reflect the fact that public service
is a high calling. Most importantly, it should be made apparent by
our federal architecture that our government is one constituted by
the people and for the people. As anyone who has spent an
31

Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 229
(2000).
32
See Pleasant Grove City, v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 470 (2009).
33
Id.
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interminable afternoon at the DMV waiting for one’s number to be
called knows, when the physical manifestation of state bureaucracy
is especially unprepossessing, compulsory interactions with
government officials are unlikely to bolster one’s sense of civic
pride and “respect.” The dropped ceilings, fluorescent lighting, and
stained, gray carpeting of such offices embody a certain set of
values, even if no designer would claim to be making any kind of
aesthetic statement by utilizing these materials. Nevertheless, such
choices do speak. They say that we value efficiency above all
things. They say that the government, as our fiduciary, is not
spending our hard-earned tax dollars on anything extraneous. They
say that anything about the nature and quality of our shared built
environment that is not strictly utilitarian represents waste, a
decadent expenditure. They say that your money should be in your
pocket, or being put to work making improvements to your
personal home on your personal property, not enhancing
communal spaces. That would be socialist, and (still, apparently)
nothing could be more un-American than that.
While this is not the sort of speech the First Amendment
typically protects, a stronger argument can be made for the
protection of architecture proper as speech. The Supreme Court has
not specifically ruled on the question of whether architecture
should be treated as speech for First Amendment purposes, but
architecture is without question a form of art, a form that many
commentators believe deserves protection.34 As John Costonis puts
it, “[f]or many, architecture and other environmental features
communicate ideas more effectively than does language.”35 It is
also important to note that any restriction on architectural speech
would constitute prior restraint, which has traditionally been able
to survive a First Amendment challenge “only in exceptional

34

See John J. Costonis, Law and Aesthetics: A Critique and a Reformulation of
the Dilemmas, 80 MICH. L. REV. 355, 448 (“If nude barroom-type dancing,
black armbands, and flags sewn on pants seats may at times be protected as
‘speech,’ it is unclear why the creative expression of one of the twentieth
century’s most influential architects is not.”).
35
Id. at 411.
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circumstances.”36 The censorship of architectural speech will
virtually always occur ex ante, when the plans are being approved,
rather than ex post, by tearing down freshly-built structures
deemed offensive after the completion of construction. “Any
system of prior restraints of expression” bears “a heavy
presumption against its constitutional validity.”37
Like so many of his executive actions, Trump’s
architecture order pushed the boundaries of presidential power.38
These boundaries were always underspecified and have always
been governed more by norms than by laws.39 While Biden has
now, mercifully, rescinded the order, a president who promulgated
an order like “Promoting Beautiful Federal Civic Architecture” at
the beginning of two terms in office rather than at the very end of
his one and only term could do incalculable damage to the
aesthetic and intellectual life of the country.40 While it is no longer
an imminent threat to the architectural profession and to the public,
Trump’s order presents a much-needed occasion to examine the
contours of presidential authority and to reflect upon whether more
constraints on that authority in this particular area of the law are
needed.
II. ARCHITECTURE AS ART
The architect is “a poet who uses not words but building
materials as a medium of expression.”41 In 1965, the critic Ada
Louise Huxtable called architecture “the most vital and meaningful
art of our time.”42 While human beings have been practicing the art
36

Near v. State of Minn. ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931).
Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963).
38
David A. Graham, The Strangest Thing About Trump’s Approach to
Presidential Power, THE ATLANTIC (June 7, 2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/06/the-strangest-thing-abouttrumps-approach-to-presidential-power/562271/.
39
Id.
40
Exec. Order No. 14,018, 86 Fed. Reg. 11,855 (Feb. 24, 2021).
41
JOHN J. COSTONIS, ICONS AND ALIENS: LAW, AESTHETICS, AND
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE 94 (1989).
42
ADA LOUISE HUXTABLE, ON ARCHITECTURE: COLLECTED REFLECTIONS ON A
37
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of architecture since we left the caves, the twentieth and twentyfirst centuries have been an exceptionally dynamic period. The
early twentieth century saw the birth of modernism, which
emphasized a break with tradition, scorn for the decorative, and a
preference for clean lines and streamlined, functional spaces that
would improve the quality of life for those who spent time inside
them.43 Many modern architects were explicitly motivated by the
desire to uplift the working classes through better urban planning
and design. Prominent modernists including Walter Gropius, Le
Corbusier, Ludwig Mies van der Rohe, and Philip Johnson came
together to create what came to be known as the “International
Style,” which favored inexpensive materials that could be massproduced in order to provide, among other things, as much
affordable housing as possible.44
Brutalism, which Trump singles out for opprobrium in his
executive order, is a species of modernism characterized by large,
block-like, geometric structures built using raw materials, most
commonly exposed concrete.45 Notable Brutalist buildings include
Rudolph Hall, which houses the Yale School of Architecture in
New Haven, the J. Edgar Hoover Building in Washington D.C.,
and Boston City Hall. The style, according to one scholar
“incorporates a radical aesthetic of anti-beauty,” which comes
across to Trump (and, to be fair, plenty of others) as ugliness.46
Brutalist architects did not, of course, set out in pursuit of ugliness,
but rather in pursuit of an honest approach to materials that
revealed the means of a building’s production.47 Finished concrete
Brutalist buildings often still bear the imprints of the plywood
CENTURY OF CHANGE 7 (2010).
43
See Atli Magnus Seelow, Function and Form: Shifts in Modernist Architects’
Design Thinking, 6.1 ARTS 1 (2017).
44
William H. Hordy, The International Style in the 1930s, 24.1 J. OF THE
SOCIETY OF ARCHITECTURAL HISTORIANS, 10, 10–14 (1965).
45
See Reyner Banham, The New Brutalism, ARCHITECTURAL REV. (Jul. 27,
2010) https://www.architectural-review.com/archive/the-new-brutalism-byreyner-banham/8603840.article.
46
Oli Mould, Brutalism Redux: Relational Monumentality and the Urban
Politics of Brutalist Architecture, 49.3 ANTIPODE, 701, 702 (2016).
47
Id. at 704.
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casing used in their construction, openly and permanently
confessing to the labor that went into the building process.48 In a
similarly Marxian vein, Brutalist structures are more likely to be
squat and earthbound than soaring, and have for this reason been
charged with “denying the spiritual in Man.”49 Where the vaulted
ceilings of Gothic cathedrals force those who enter to direct their
attentions upward, heavenward, Brutalist buildings recall us to the
material world, its limits, inequities, and changeability.
In the latter part of the twentieth century, modernism gave
way to postmodernism, which lacked the coherence and
ideological consistency of modernism.50 Postmodern architecture
embraced pluralism—its instigators were scavengers and pasticheartists, borrowing from historical forms to create new hybrid
styles.51 As compared with modernism, writes one scholar, “[t]he
contrast is between perfection and violated perfection.”52
Postmodern architecture is more likely to allow its seams and
contradictions to remain visible, to emphasize the distance
predecessors have fallen short in their quest for utopia.53 More
formalist than functionalist, postmodern architecture has also been
seen as more concerned with interrogating its own aesthetic
language than with creating structures amenable to the flourishing
of flesh-and-blood human beings.
The most recent postmodern leap forward may be best
exemplified by the late, great Iraqi architect Zaha Hadid, whose
dramatically canted buildings often dispense with right angles
altogether, and are made possible by new digital technologies and
advanced building delivery systems that were not available to

48

Id.
Reyner Banham, The New Brutalism, ARCHITECTURAL REV. (Jul. 27, 2010)
https://www.architectural-review.com/archive/the-new-brutalism-by-reynerbanham/8603840.article.
50
PHILLIP JOHNSON & MARK WIGLEY, DECONSTRUCTIVIST ARCHITECTURE 8
(1988).
51
HUXTABLE, supra note 38 at 311.
52
JOHNSON & WIGLEY, supra note 44 at 8.
53
Id.
49
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previous generations.54 Together with colleagues including Peter
Eisenman, Rem Koolhaas, and Frank Gehry, Hadid developed
what came to be known as “Deconstructivism.” 55 Characterized
by, as Huxtable put it, “[s]tructures that defy gravity and common
sense by looking as if they are about to fall down or fly apart”
Deconstructivism is the other architectural style that now finds
itself in the crosshairs of Trump’s order.56 Some scholars see
Deconstructivism as a response to Constructivism, the technophilic
communist architectural movement that flourished in the Soviet
Union in the 1920s and 1930s.57 Others understand
Deconstructivism to be spiritually allied with deconstruction, the
roughly contemporaneous mode of philosophical critique
inaugurated by Jacques Derrida.58 Highly influential, if
controversial, deconstruction is not a synonym for demolition.
Rather, deconstruction was fashioned as a rejoinder to Western
philosophy’s historical overemphasis on what Derrida called the
“metaphysics of presence.”59 To engage in deconstruction is to
take apart hitherto uninterrogated unitary concepts such as truth,
presence, essence, identity, and origin to see how they are
constructed, to determine what held them together in the first
place, and to emphasize the crucial role played by absence and
difference.60 Derrida was a philosopher who drew inspiration from
linguistics and semiotics, but the political implications of his
project were significant; deconstruction works to expose the
ideological assumptions undergirding our lives and helped
inaugurate a shift in focus from the visible to the invisible, the
marginal, the silenced, and erased.61 His work made its way to the
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American academy via literary criticism, and helped launch such
fields as cultural studies, feminist studies, gender and sexuality
studies, and postcolonial studies.62 Obviously, this intellectual
tradition would not necessarily be legible to someone walking by a
Deconstructivist building, but it seems unlikely to be purely
coincidental that the two disfavored architectural styles named by
name in Trump’s order happen to be historically identified with
attempts to uplift the poor and otherwise disenfranchised.
Lest there be any question that architecture is “expressive,”
the twentieth century also saw the form being pressed into service
by totalitarian regimes with very particular agendas and very
specific messages they hoped to send with their state architecture.
After Trump’s draft order leaked, architectural historians wasted
no time in pointing out that the neoclassicism Trump favors was
the style of choice for Albert Speer, official architect of the Nazi
government.63 Some Trump apologists attacked this line of
criticism, accusing the left of making yet another knee-jerk Hitler
comparison.64 In this case, however, the comparison seemed
strikingly unexaggerated. Linking the Aryan race with the heroic
legacy of Hellenism was an important theme in much National
politics-of-jacques-derrida/.
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Socialist cultural production; Leni Riefenstahl’s Triumph of the
Will begins with a long shot of the ruins and statuary of ancient
Greece rising up out of the mists of time.65 The 1936 Olympic
games in Berlin were stage-managed to suggest the torch being
passed from the ancient Greeks to the Germans in Riefenstahl’s
Olympia. The 1937 opening of the Haus der Deutschen Kunst
(House of German Art) was marked with a procession featuring
“2000 years of German Culture” going back to the classical era in
which “the past was reinvented as myth, and as an endorsement of
the racist ideologies of the present.”66 Nazi architects scorned
modernism as “degenerate” and opted instead for Doric columns
and cornices. They built monuments to their “martyrs” modeled on
ancient Greek tombs, embracing the tragic view of life articulated
in Attic drama.67 National Socialist architecture was “an
architecture that found its ultimate meaning in the celebration of
death and sacrifice.”68 Hitler himself, dreaming of the thousandyear Reich, was partial to Roman architecture and its associations
with empire.69 Like any art form, architecture can convey meaning
and embody values. Architecture can trace visions of utopia or
reflect unfathomable hate.
The American legal system recognizes architectural works
as one of eight categories of “works of authorship” under the 1990
Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act (“AWCPA”).70 The
statutory definition of an architectural work is “the design of a
building as embodied in any tangible medium of expression,
including a building, architectural plans, or drawings. The work
includes the overall form as well as the arrangement and
composition of spaces and elements in the design, but does not
include individual standard features.”71 The AWCPA amended the
65
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Copyright Act of 1976, which contained no special provision for
architecture, only a general “pictorial, graphic, and sculptural
works” category.72 This was found by Congress to be
insufficient.73 The legislative history reveals that Congress passed
the AWCPA because it found architecture to be “a form of artistic
expression that performs a significant societal purpose,
domestically and internationally.”74 Creating a dedicated category
for architecture also brought the United States into compliance
with the terms of the Berne Convention for the Protection of
Literary and Artistic Works, the “world’s most important copyright
convention,” which today has 179 signatory countries.75 The
House Report on the AWCPA states that the purpose of making
architectural works protectible was to promote “the progress of
architectural innovation,”76 a goal consistent with copyright law’s
constitutional mandate to “promote the progress of science and the
useful arts.”77 The House Report further states that “[a]rchitecture
plays a central role in our daily lives, not only as a form of shelter
or as an investment, but also as a work of art. It is an art form that
performs a very public, social purpose. As Winston Churchill is
reputed to have once remarked,” the Report continues, “‘We shape
our buildings and our buildings shape us.’”78
III. ART AS SPEECH
While among laypeople it is generally accepted, even taken
as self-evident, that art is unique in its expressive capacities, art is
not special in the realm of First Amendment law. Amy Adler finds
the status of art as speech under the First Amendment to be
“surprisingly uncertain.”79 As Ramon Maroz puts it, “while the
72
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freedom
of artistic creativity
has
indeed
received
constitutional protection, the U.S. Supreme Court has neither
distinguished artistic freedom from other forms of expression nor
given any meaning to the term ‘art speech.’”80 While different
circuits and different judges may be more or less attuned to the
singular role artistic expression plays in social development, there
is no official consensus that all art should receive stricter
protection than any other type of speech under the First
Amendment, leading some to argue that “the role of artistic
expression under the First Amendment appears to be
undervalued.”81
Some of the Supreme Court’s most useful pseudodefinitions of “art speech” are negative formulations; the Court has
on occasion held that such-and-such expression or behavior is not
entitled to First Amendment protection because it is not art, which
unquestionably is entitled to First Amendment protection.82
In Miller v. California, for example, the Court essentially
defined art speech as that which is not obscene, or that which does
not portray “hard-core sexual conduct for its own sake, and for the
ensuing commercial gain.”83 Marvin Miller had been convicted of
violating a California obscenity law for conducting a mass mailing
campaign of brochures advertising books consisting of
pornographic images.84 He brought an action alleging that the law
violated the First Amendment. The Court upheld the conviction,
finding that “obscene material is unprotected by the First
Amendment,” but confining the scope of obscenity regulation to
“works which depict or describe sexual conduct.”85 The Court
further clarified that “[a] state offense must also be limited to
80

Raman Maroz, The Freedom of Artistic Expression in the Jurisprudence of the
United States Supreme Court and Federal Constitutional Court of Germany: A
Comparative Analysis, 35 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 341, 346 (2017).
81
Id.
82
See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. Of Bos., 515
U.S. 557, 569 (1995); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
83
Miller, 413 U.S. at 35.
84
Id. at 18.
85
Id. at 23–24.

2021 FEDERAL ARCHITECTURE AND FIRST AMENDMENT LIMITS

65

works which, taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient interest in
sex, which portray sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, and
which, taken as a whole, do not have serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value.”86 To determine whether the work in
question satisfied these three highly subjective criteria, the Court
advised future triers of fact to consider “the average person,
applying contemporary community standards.”87 The “lacking
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value” formulation
replaced the “utterly without redeeming social value” test
advanced in the 1966 case, Memoirs v. Massachusetts.88 According
to Miller, work that has artistic value, but perhaps only “serious”
artistic value, whatever that means, is entitled to First Amendment
protection.89
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group
of Boston addressed art speech in somewhat greater specificity, and
with considerably more nuance.90 The case concerned a Saint
Patrick’s Day parade organized by a private veterans group that
refused to allow the Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston
(“GLIB”) to march with them.91 GLIB responded by bringing an
action alleging a violation of the state public accommodations law,
which prohibited discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation.92 The parade’s organizers replied that compelling them
to accept GLIB’s participation in the parade would constitute a
violation of their right to the freedom of speech.93 The lower court
sided with GLIB, finding impermissible discrimination in the
group’s exclusion.94 The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that
the parade constituted protectible expression, and that applying
Massachusetts’s law to such expressive activity would “require
speakers to modify the content of their expression to whatever
86
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extent beneficiaries of the law choose to alter it with messages of
their own”95 The Court reasoned that, especially on a public
street—since time immemorial a place where people have gathered
to express their views—people should be free from state
interference in the content of their speech.96
In analyzing the status of the parade as expression entitled
to First Amendment protection, the Court said that “[t]he protected
expression that inheres in a parade is not limited to its banners and
songs…for the Constitution looks beyond written or spoken words
as mediums of expression.”97 Various kinds of symbolism, the
Court noted, could also convey ideas.98 “[A] narrow, succinctly
articulable message is not a condition of constitutional protection,
which if confined to expressions conveying a ‘particularized
message,’ would never reach the unquestionably shielded painting
of Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold Schöenberg, or Jabberwocky
verse of Lewis Carroll.”99 What these three examples have in
common is their medium-specificity.100 These works or bodies of
work all reject the notion that art can be translated across media,
into discursive language. Pollock’s painting is concerned with the
nature of paint and gesture; all “meaning” flows from this primary
exploration. The language of “Jabberwocky” is sensuous, playful,
intuitive; the words signify not by indexing to familiar dictionary
definitions, but though rhythm, assonance, and rhyme. Fortunately
for art, if unfortunately for GLIB, the Hurley holding made it clear
that the First Amendment protects even so-called “art for art’s
sake.”101 Art speech is not, or is not necessarily, message-driven
95
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speech.
Lacking a more extensive general jurisprudence of art
speech, we can look to judicial pronouncements on the First
Amendment’s interaction with individual works of art and, more
rarely, judicial pronouncements on particular media or categories
of artistic expression.
In Kaplan v. California, the Supreme Court acknowledged
that the visual arts have First Amendment protection.102 The case
concerned the proprietor of an adult book store’s challenge to a
California obscenity ordinance that made the sale of pornographic
books a misdemeanor.103 The book that occasioned the action
contained no pictures, only “repetitive descriptions of physical,
sexual conduct, ‘clinically’ explicit to the point of being
nauseous,” according to Justice Burger.104 The Court hesitated to
classify the book as obscene and therefore not entitled to First
Amendment protection under Miller v. California because “[a]
book seems to have a different and preferred place in our hierarchy
of values.”105 Ultimately, however, the Court did find that the
“commercial exposure and sale of obscene materials to anyone,
including consenting adults, is subject to state regulation.”106 In
arriving at this conclusion, the Court noted that, like non-obscene
books, non-obscene “pictures, paintings, drawings, and
engravings” are protected by the First Amendment.107
In Massachusetts v. Oakes, the Court entertains the idea of
modeling as protectable First Amendment speech108. The case
102
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concerned a First Amendment challenge to a Massachusetts law
making it a crime to encourage or permit a child under eighteen
years of age to pose or perform nude in any book, magazine,
pamphlet, film, photograph, or picture.109 The plaintiff was facing
ten years in prison for taking ten photographs of his “partially nude
and physically mature” fourteen-year old stepdaughter, who was
attending modeling school at the time of the incident.110 The
photographs depicted the teenager “sitting, lying, and reclining on
top of a bar, clad only in a red and white striped bikini panty and a
red scarf,” which left her breasts fully exposed in all of the
photographs.111 While the Court remanded the case without
reaching the substantive First Amendment issues presented, Justice
Brennan wrote in dissent that “[p]hotography, painting, and other
two-dimensional forms of artistic reproduction…are plainly
expressive activities that ordinarily qualify for First Amendment
protection…And modeling, both independently and by virtue of its
close association with those activities, enjoys like shelter under the
First Amendment.”112
In Ward v. Rock Against Racism, the Court made it clear
that “[m]usic, as a form of expression and communication, is
protected under the First Amendment.”113 The plaintiff in the case
was an antiracist group (“RAR”) that sponsored an annual program
of speeches and rock music at the Central Park bandshell in
Manhattan to promote their cause.114 The bandshell happens to
abut some of the priciest real estate in the world, and over the years
the city had received numerous complaints from residents that
RAR used excessive sound amplification during their concerts.115
RAR also had a history of failing to cooperate with city officials to
find a volume level that would be an acceptable compromise for
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all.116 In advance of their 1984 concert, city officials warned RAR
that their permit would be revoked if specified volume limits were
exceeded.117 The limits were exceeded,118 and the following year,
RAR was denied a permit.119 The city adopted guidelines stating
that anyone using the bandshell for performances would have to
use high-quality sound equipment newly purchased by the city, as
well as a city-employed sound technician.120 RAR found these
guidelines objectionable, and filed an action against various city
officials.121 The Court found the bandshell guidelines to be a
reasonable time, place, or manner restriction, and clarified that the
city need not prove that its regulation was the least intrusive means
of furthering its legitimate government interest in noise control.122
In coming to this conclusion, however, the Court opined
extensively on the importance of music, “one of the oldest forms of
human expression.”123 Rulers from those imagined in “Plato’s
discourse in the Republic to the totalitarian state in our own times,”
Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court, “have known [music’s]
capacity to appeal to the intellect and to the emotions and have
censored musical compositions to serve the needs of the state. The
Constitution prohibits any like attempts in our own legal order.”124
Upholding a “fairness doctrine” requirement that opposing
views of matters of public concern be given equal time on the radio
in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., the Court found that
“broadcasting is clearly a medium affected by a First Amendment
interest.”125 Between 1949 and 1987, the Federal Communications
Commission (“FCC”) imposed on radio and television
116
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broadcasters the requirement “that discussion of public issues be
presented on broadcast stations, and that each side of those issues
must be given fair coverage.”126 This included the requirement that
if particular individuals or groups were personally attacked on a
particular program, they must be given the opportunity to respond
on air.127 When the FCC attempted to compel Red Lion
Broadcasting to give author Fred Cook an opportunity to respond
to a personal attack that had been leveled against him on one of its
radio stations, Red Lion brought an action against the FCC,
alleging that the regulations abridged their freedom of speech and
press.128 They argued that the First Amendment protected their
desire to use their frequencies to broadcast whatever they chose,
and to exclude whomever they chose from ever using that
frequency.129 While acknowledging that radio and television were
entitled to First Amendment protection, the Court found that
“differences in the new media justify differences in the First
Amendment standards applied to them.”130 Such newly-available
technologies as television and radio were capable of producing an
ever-present cacophony that would “drown[] out civilized private
speech.”131 Accordingly, “[t]he right of free speech of a
broadcaster” the Court said, “does not embrace a right to snuff out
the free speech of others,” and fairness doctrine regulations were
therefore necessary and appropriate.132
The Court recognized that film is entitled to protection as
speech in Joseph Burstyn v. Wilson.133 In that case, the Court
struck down a New York ordinance permitting the banning of
motion pictures deemed “sacrilegious” on First Amendment
grounds.134 Notwithstanding the respondent’s urging that “motion
pictures possess a greater capacity for evil, particularly among the
126
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youth of a community, than other modes of expression,” the court
held that motion pictures are “a form of expression whose liberty is
safeguarded by the First Amendment.”135 Exhibiting unusual
sensitivity to the complex ways in which art may “speak,” Justice
Clark wrote that “[i]t cannot be doubted that motion pictures are a
significant medium for the communication of ideas. They may
affect public attitudes and behavior in a variety of ways, ranging
from direct espousal of a political or social doctrine to the subtle
shaping of thought which characterizes all artistic expression.”136
Southeastern Promotions v. Conrad established that theater
can claim First Amendment protection.137 The case involved a
challenge to a municipal theater in Tennessee’s refusal to permit a
production of the musical Hair to be staged. An anthem of 1960s
counterculture, Hair expressed contempt for the Vietnam War,
sexual repression, and the suffocating conformity of mainstream
American life with scenes incorporating simulated sex acts, drug
use, and such glib, yet accurate, denunciations of U.S. foreign
policy as “[t]he War is White people sending Black people to fight
Yellow people to defend the land they stole from the Red
people.”138 There was also the famous “nude scene.” Before its
Broadway opening, the New York Times sent a critic for the
express purpose of sussing out just exactly how much nudity Hair
contained. “The first act of the rock musical ends with several
healthy young men facing front and center in the altogether,” she
reported.139 “Just how many stark naked males there are and
whether the girl hippies are equally unclothed has been the subject
of urgent dispute among those who have been attending previews
of ‘Hair’ during the last few weeks.”140 Alas, the nude scene was
staged in semi-darkness, with different cast members disrobing or
135
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keeping their clothes on as the spirit moved them from one evening
to the next, so a definitive answer could not be given.141 Some
community members found it all rather shocking and distasteful
when the show came to Chattanooga in 1971. So did Chief Justice
Burger, who would sneer in posing a hypothetical while dissenting
from a different opinion the year the case was decided, “assuming
arguendo that there could be a play performed in a theater by nude
actors involving genuine communication of ideas,” as if live nudity
and ideas are self-evidently incompatible.142 Nevertheless, the
Southeastern Court held the city venue’s denial of permission to be
unconstitutional prior restraint, and in doing so affirmed that
theater is entitled to First Amendment protection.143
More sweepingly, in Schad v. Mount Ephraim, which dealt
with a municipal zoning ordinance banning live nude dancing, the
Court found that “[e]ntertainment, as well as political and
ideological speech, is protected; motion pictures, programs
broadcast by radio and television, and live entertainment, such as
musical and dramatic works, fall within the First Amendment’s
guarantee.”144 Though not all art is entertainment, and not all
entertainment is art, the two terms are conflated often enough to
suggest that the Court’s endorsement of protection here might
reasonably be interpreted as broadly applicable to the arts in
general. This is the position of numerous commentators who
believe that “art speech should be presumptively protected
expression and generally immune from regulation.”145 Perhaps if
so many of our key free speech cases were not occasioned by
disputes involving pornography and nude erotic dancing, which
“falls within the outer ambit of the First Amendment’s protection,”
the Court’s jurisprudence in this area would be more robust and the
141
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status of art as a type of speech uniquely deserving of protection
more clear.146
IV. ARCHITECTURE AS SPEECH
Even assuming that architecture is art, and that art is
entitled to protection as speech for the purposes of the First
Amendment, there is nothing talismanic about this status. “Each
medium of expression, of course, must be assessed for First
Amendment purposes by standards suited to it, for each may
present its own problems.”147 While architecture is a form of visual
art, is it plainly more than merely visual. Like the examples of nonrepresentational art cited in Hurley, architecture, and particularly
modern architecture, is untranslatable. What a building “says”
cannot be communicated by a drawing, or a film, or a concerto.
Huxtable observed that architects of the late twentieth century in
particular added a fourth dimension to architecture’s conventional
definition as a three-dimensional, spatial art: “an aesthetic of
experiences in time, of responses dependent on the passage from
one part of the building to another.”148 While any full experience
of a work of architecture will be time-based, architecture has little
in common with “live entertainment.” To succeed, a building must
also “address fundamental concerns—the needs and pleasures of
the body and spirit—that all great architecture serves and turns into
art.”149 Because of the basic duty to not only address but protect
the human body, architects are also accustomed to working within
the confines of government restrictions on things like travel
distance to the nearest exit, height and bulk in designated historic
areas, and earthquake-readiness. Buildings are both functional and
aesthetic objects, and the most salient feature of any building is
always going to be whether or not it is able to keep from collapsing
146
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around the heads of the people inside it. For these reasons, and
because architecture requires so much in the way of resources,
partnerships with government have long been a crucial part of the
development of the medium itself. One could even say that state
sponsorship is the vital, beating heart of architecture. This makes
architecture quite different from other art forms. As a result,
architecture is not at all well-served by existing art law doctrine,
and this is a problem.
It is within the police power of the state to promote the
“general welfare,” and as the aesthetic character of a locality has
been treated as an element of the “general welfare,” architectural
aesthetics have not infrequently been held to fall within the scope
of states’ and cities’ police power.150 This treatment of aesthetics is
a relatively recent phenomenon. Commentators have identified
three historical stages in judicial treatment of aesthetic regulation,
the first of which is exemplified by the opinion of a New Jersey
judge who in 1903 wrote that he could find no case “which holds
that a man may be deprived of his property because his tastes are
not those of his neighbors. Esthetic considerations are a matter of
luxury and indulgence rather than of necessity.”151 During this
period, courts were wary of the idea that the government’s police
power extended to aesthetic initiatives.152 During the second
period, courts upheld aesthetic regulations if they could be tied to
such traditional state interests as health, safety, or property
values.153 The third period, in which we find ourselves today, is
characterized by the greater willingness of courts to uphold
regulations issued for aesthetic reasons alone.154 Writing for a
unanimous Supreme Court in Berman v. Parker, Justice Douglas
captured the ethos of this period in declaring that the values
150
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represented by the concept of the public welfare “are spiritual as
well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary.”155 It is within the
legislature’s power, he wrote, “to determine that the community
should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean,
well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled.”156
The uninterrogated assumption of Justice Douglas’s
opinion is that “beauty” is a stable and transcendent virtue. In
subsequent opinions, the Supreme Court has cautioned that
“esthetic judgments are necessarily subjective, defying objective
evaluation, and for that reason must be carefully scrutinized.”157
While lower courts have readily upheld as constitutional laws that
regulate architecture on aesthetic grounds alone, jurisprudence in
this area has been criticized as incoherent.158 “The judiciary has
failed to discipline the aesthetic regulation system by clearly
articulating principles of court-applied law as a check on abusive
or misguided aesthetic initiatives,” Costonis argues.159
As a result, when the government’s conception of beauty
comes into conflict with an individual’s, the government tends to
prevail. Homeowners have discovered this when their plans to
construct avant-garde dream homes run afoul of local government
ordinances or the determinations of architectural boards.160
In State ex rel. Stoyanoff v. Berkeley, for example, the
Stoyanoffs brought an action alleging that they were deprived of
their property without due process of law when they were refused a
building permit for the construction of their proposed
“ultramodern” residence.161 Their building plan was rejected by the
Architectural Board of the City of Ladue, which was established to
155
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foster “appropriate standards of beauty and conformity” in the city,
and to ensure that “unsightly, grotesque and unsuitable structures,
detrimental to the stability of value and the welfare of surrounding
property, structures and residents, and to the general welfare and
happiness of the community, be avoided.”162 The lot where the
Stoyanoffs sought to build their house was in a neighborhood
where “virtually all” of the existing houses were “two-story houses
of conventional architectural design, such as Colonial, French
Provincial or English.”163 According to the city, the Stoyanoff’s
proposed house was “a monstrosity of grotesque design, which
would seriously impair the value of property in the
neighborhood.”164 According to the court, it was “to be of a
pyramid shape, with a flat top, and with triangular shaped windows
or doors at one or more corners.”165 The Stoyanoffs argued that the
ordinance
establishing
the
Architectural
Board
was
unconstitutional because it empowered the board to permit or deny
uses of personal property based on impermissible aesthetic criteria.
Since it was within the police power of a state to pass
regulations designed to promote the general welfare, the city
prevailed on the grounds that “[t]he character of the district, its
suitability for particular uses, and the conservation of the values of
buildings therein” are “directly related to the general welfare of the
community.”166 The ordinance establishing the Architectural Board
was deemed constitutional. Most homeowners who seek to
distinguish themselves in similar ways fail for similar reasons, but
overly vague or arbitrary ordinances calling for architectural or
aesthetic uniformity have been struck down by courts under
rational basis review.167
162

Id. at 306-307.
Id. at 307.
164
Id.
165
Id. at 308.
166
Id. at 309.
167
See, e.g., R.S.T. Builders, Inc. v. Vill. Of Bolingbrook, 489 N.E.2d 1151,
1152 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986); Pacesetter Homes, Inc. v. Vill of Olympia Fields, 244
N.E.2d 369, 373 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968); Morristown Road Assoc. v. Mayor, 394
A.2d 157 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 1959); Hankins v. Borough of Rockleigh,
150 A.2d 63 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1959).
163

2021 FEDERAL ARCHITECTURE AND FIRST AMENDMENT LIMITS

77

V. GOVERNMENT SPEECH AND FEDERAL ARCHITECTURE
Should the federal government undertake to build a
neoclassical courthouse in the style called for by Trump’s
executive order, would the government be “speaking” through
architecture “on its own behalf[?]”168 Or would the government be
engaging in “viewpoint discrimination in the exercise of public
authority over expressive activity[?]”169 I believe it would be doing
both, and in so doing, implicating two bodies of First Amendment
doctrine that prove imperfectly compatible in the context of
architectural expression.
A. Government Speech
A Trump-style courthouse could be interpreted as a kind of
government monument, which would render it essentially exempt
from First Amendment scrutiny as “government speech.” 170 As the
Supreme Court observed in Pleasant Grove City v. Summum,
“[g]overnments have long used monuments to speak to the
public…A monument, by definition, is a structure that is designed
as a means of expression. When a government entity arranges for
the construction of a monument, it does so because it wishes to
convey some thought or instill some feeling in those who see the
structure.”171 The issue in Summum was whether the Free Speech
Clause entitles a private group to insist that a municipality permit it
to place a monument in a city park alongside other donated
monuments. The park in question had eleven privately donated
permanent displays, including a Ten Commandments monument.
168
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Summum, a religious organization that, most notably, practices
Modern Mummification™,172 attempted to donate their own
monument.173 Summum’s president wrote to the mayor of Pleasant
Grove requesting permission to erect a stone monument “which
would contain the Seven Aphorisms of Summum and be similar in
size and nature to the Ten Commandments monument” already on
display in the park.174 The City denied the request, explaining that
it only accepted monuments that “either (1) directly relate to the
history of Pleasant Grove, or (2) were donated by groups with
longstanding ties to the Pleasant Grove community.”175 Summum
filed an action alleging that the City had violated the Free Speech
Clause of the First Amendment by accepting the Ten
Commandments monument, but rejecting Summum’s.176
The Court found for the City, concluding that, like
“government-commissioned
and
government-financed
monument[s]” installed on public property, “privately financed and
donated monuments that the government accepts and displays to
the public on government land” constitute “government speech.”177
Because in curating theses monuments, the City was effectively
speaking on its own behalf, the First Amendment was not
implicated.178 “If governments must maintain viewpoint neutrality
in selecting donated monuments,” Justice Alito wrote for the
plurality, “they must either prepare for cluttered parks or face
pressure to remove longstanding and cherished monuments.”179
From a purely practical perspective, since the government cannot
in all situations be expected to say “yes” to everyone, the
government must be able to say “no” without triggering the First
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Amendment’s restrictions on viewpoint discrimination. 180
This permissive government speech doctrine congealed in
Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, a 2015 case in
which the Texas Divisions of the Sons of Confederate Veterans
filed suit against the chairman of the board of the Texas
Department of Motor Vehicles over its refusal to accept a proposed
specialty license plate design featuring a Confederate flag.181 The
Court held that Texas’s specialty license plates were government
speech, the content of which the state was free to restrict as it saw
fit.182 “When government speaks,” Justice Breyer wrote for the
majority, “it is not barred by the Free Speech Clause from
determining the content of what it says.”183 If the Free Speech
Clause were interpreted as barring government from making such
determinations, “it is not easy to imagine how government would
function,” said the Court. 184
The Second Circuit’s lamentable opinion in Serra v. United
States General Services Administration suggests that architects
would be virtually powerless to prevent the destruction of their
works should the GSA have taken Trump’s order as a cue to begin
demolishing modern buildings like the San Francisco Federal
Building or United States courthouses in Buffalo, Austin, or
Cleveland and replacing them with antebellum architecture that
reminds us all of when America was truly “great.”185 A few years
after the GSA had installed artist Richard Serra’s commissioned,
site-specific sculpture Titled Arc in Manhattan’s Federal Plaza, the
agency caved to public pressure and announced that the sculpture
would be removed.186 Tilted Arc was a 12-foot high and 120-foot
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long, gently-bending arc of steel.187 The monumental sculpture
bisected the Plaza, and some federal employees who worked in the
adjacent offices were annoyed that they had to walk around it on
their lunch breaks.188 Serra brought suit, alleging that the
sculpture’s removal would violate his freedom of expression under
the First Amendment.189 To move the sculpture, Serra explained,
would be to destroy it, to mutilate its meaning.190 As a site-specific
work, Titled Arc had been “conceived and created in relation to the
particular conditions of a specific site.”191 In an opinion that does
not bode well for the protectability of architectural speech, the
Second Circuit effectively held that site-specific work is not
entitled to First Amendment protection.192 All architecture, after
all, is site-specific art.
Applying reasoning that would likely not be accepted postHurley, the Serra court said that relocating Tilted Arc would not
preclude Serra from communicating his ideas in other ways:
“Notwithstanding that the sculpture is site-specific and may lose its
artistic value if relocated, Serra is free to express his artistic and
political views through the press and through other means that do
not entail obstructing the Plaza.”193 The court also determined that
since Serra had “already had six years to convey his message
through the sculpture’s presence in the Plaza” and since “the First
Amendment protects the freedom to express one’s views, not the
freedom to continue speaking forever, the relocation of the
sculpture after a lengthy period of initial display does not
significantly impair Serra’s right to free speech.”194 This
conclusion shows how sorely in need American jurisprudence is of
a coherent art speech doctrine, for while it might be appropriate to
187
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say to protestors occupying a public space night and day for weeks
on end that the First Amendment does not entitle them to go on
speaking forever, art like Serra’s is built to last, to “speak” as its
steel rusts and changes color over time, as it alters pedestrians’
relationships to surrounding streets and structures, as it shades
people in the summer and shelters them from wind and sleet in the
winter.195
The second rationale offered by the Second Circuit,
however, has only been buttressed by Summum, Walker, and other
recent government speech cases.196 The Serra court said that, even
if site-specific work were entitled to protection, “the First
Amendment has only limited application in a case like the present
one where the artistic expression belongs to the Government rather
than a private individual.”197 Since Tilted Arc was federal property,
commissioned by the GSA and sited on federal property, the GSA
was free to dispose of it as it saw fit.198 The “GSA, which is
charged with providing office space for federal employees, may
remove from its buildings artworks that it decides are aesthetically
unsuitable for particular locations.”199 The government’s interest in
controlling its property prevailed over the First Amendment rights
of artists like Serra.200
All of this suggests that artists or architects commissioned
to create work on federal land do so at their own risk. The Serra
court did leave open the possibility for a viewpoint discrimination
challenge when it came to government-commissioned works of art,
noting that “[e]ven where, as here, the removal of an artwork does
not restrict the artist's free speech because the work is owned by
the Government, it is still possible that the Government's broad
195
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discretion to dispose of its property could be exercised in an
impermissibly repressive partisan or political manner.”201
However, unless a work of art openly and explicitly communicated
its “message,” and that meaning or message was unmistakably
partisan or political, it is difficult to imagine such a viewpoint
discrimination challenge being successful on these terms. Since
most works of art and architecture, particularly modern art and
architecture, are more coy than this, they stand or fall at the
pleasure of the General Services Administration.
B. Censoring Architects
The Court wrestled with the problem of viewpoint
discrimination vis-à-vis arts funding in National Endowment for
the Arts v. Finley, when four performance artists brought an action
alleging that the National Endowment for the Arts (“NEA”) had
violated their First Amendment rights by denying them grants.202
The artists challenged the law that directed the Chairperson of the
NEA to “tak[e] into consideration general standards of decency
and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American
public” in adjudicating grant applications.203 “Decent” and
“respectful,” would not be among the words anyone familiar with
the work of the named plaintiff Karen Finley would use to describe
her performances. In her aggressively feminist one-woman shows,
Finley often took her clothes off and smeared food on her body to
represent the violation of women.204 Conservative lawmakers
objected to the idea of taxpayer dollars funding such
“obscenity.”205 Most of those leading the culture war against
Finley’s work—prominently Republican Senator Jesse Helms from
201
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North Carolina—had never seen it. Had they, it would had to have
become clear that the last thing Finley wanted to do was appeal to
any prurient interest in sex. We Keep Our Victims Ready, one of
the performances that earned Finley her notoriety, was inspired by
the story of Tawana Brawley, a sixteen-year-old African-American
girl who was found in a trash bag in upstate New York, dazed,
semi-conscious and covered in human excrement after having
been, she said, raped by a group of white police officers.206 In the
piece that grew out of her distress at hearing Brawley’s story,
Finley smeared her body with chocolate because, as she said
reflecting on the piece years later, “I’m a woman and women are
usually treated like shit.”207 Then Finley covered herself with red
candy hearts because, she explained, “after a woman is treated like
shit, she becomes more loveable.”208 After the hearts, Finley
covered herself with bean sprouts, “which smelled like semen and
looked like semen—because after a woman is treated like shit, and
loved for it, she is jacked off on.”209 Finally, she spread tinsel all
over her body, “like a Cher dress—because,” she said, “no matter
how badly a woman has been treated, she’ll still get it together to
dress for dinner.”210 The performance was confrontational,
upsetting, and explicit, but if it invited a sexual gaze, it did so only
to indict the impulse to sexualize a woman in pain, to sexualize
women’s pain generally. The NEA’s “decency” requirement was a
convenient mask for misogyny. It also gave cover to
homophobia—the other three members of the “NEA Four” were
gay and their work frequently dealt with issues of queer identity.211
Regrettably, the Court sided with the NEA, finding no
substantial risk that the application of the “decency” law would
lead to the suppression of speech, and observing that “when the
206
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Government is acting as patron rather than as sovereign, the
consequences of imprecision are not constitutionally severe.”212
The Government “may allocate competitive funding according to
criteria that would be impermissible were direct regulation of
speech or a criminal penalty at stake,” the Court held.213
Prefiguring the logic of Summum, Justice O’Connor wrote for the
majority that “it would be impossible to have a highly selective
grant program without denying money to a large amount of
constitutionally protected expression…absolute neutrality is
simply inconceivable.”214 However, she continued, “if subsidy
were ‘manipulated’ to have a ‘coercive effect,’ then relief could be
appropriate.”215
In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia took the position
that manipulating the criteria for subsidy to have a coercive effect
would in fact be just fine. “Congress,” after all, “did not abridge
the speech of those who disdain the beliefs and values of the
American public, nor did it abridge indecent speech.”216 He
continued, “[t]hose who wish to create indecent and disrespectful
art are as unconstrained now as they were before the enactment of
this statute. Avant-garde artistes such as respondents remain
entirely free to epater les bourgeois; they are merely deprived of
the additional satisfaction of having the bourgeoisie taxed to pay
for it.”217
Reserving judgment on whether Scalia’s assessment
reflects an accurate understanding of the material conditions of
performance artists’ lives, it is clear that this argument cannot be
translated for architects. While it is true that a performance artist
could, in theory, perform a scrappy, jerry-built version of her show
in a public park or a bar with no costumes, props, lights, or
amplified sound, all of which cost money, architects cannot engage
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in the same sort of guerilla art-making. Large-scale architectural
projects cannot happen without the government getting involved—
architects cannot create without the government issuing the
appropriate building permits. An architect also requires far more in
the way of resources to perform the basic work of creation than a
performance artist who uses her body as medium or a writer who
requires only a pen and paper.
This is true for both privately-commissioned projects and
government-commissioned ones. The architect cannot create
without the funding for workers, glass, and steel. Frank Lloyd
Wright lamented this necessary entwinement with the apparatus of
commerce, saying that because of the practical compromises he is
required to make in order to create, the architect “is not quite like
his brother the artist,” who can be quite prolific while
simultaneously existing in a state of perpetual hostility towards
commerce.218 Instead, “the architect, the master of creative effort
whose province it was to make imperishable record of the noblest
in the life of his race in his time...has been caught in the
commercial rush and whirl…He has dragged his ancient
monuments to the market places…He has degenerated to a
fakir.”219 When it comes to federal buildings, the government of
course holds all the cards. Even a stratospherically wealthy
architect cannot build a courthouse that will serve as anything
other than a ghostly, full-size diorama without the endorsement of
the government.
VI. CONCLUSION
Architects require government subsidy in order to create
public buildings, which are the property of the public, but also
works of art that constitute the expressive speech of individual
artists. The creation of an official architectural style is tantamount
to the manipulation of subsidy to have a “coercive effect,” which
the Supreme Court has indicated could be grounds for relief in
218
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First Amendment challenges.220 Notwithstanding Biden’s recision
of “Promoting Beautiful Federal Civic Architecture,” the order’s
First Amendment implications are disturbing. The president should
not have the power to hold an entire major art form hostage, and no
nation’s shared built environment should be so vulnerable to the
passing fancies of any single individual.
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